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Abstract 
One of the central tenets of socialism and central planning economics, as practiced 
by  the  East  European  countries,  was  that  this  organization  of  employment, 
production and activity could achieve higher growth rates than market economies. 
This  paper  presents  an  historical  analysis  of  economic  performance  of  seven 
countries:  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  GDR,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania  and 
Yugoslavia  during  the  crucial  period  of  socialism  (1960-80).  It  studies  the 
relationship  between  industry  output  growth  rates  and  output  instabilities  in 
approximately  twenty-five  industries.  Using  empirically  estimated  models  it  was 
found that the instability (volatility) of industry output increased with growth rates 
and at an increasing rate. Since instability creates substantial costs, these findings 
imply  that  the  true  value  of  income  and  product  streams  in  East  European 
countries, after discounting for instability, was lower than otherwise believed. A 
decomposition of instability into two sources, systemic structure versus operational 
implementation is suggested. 
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1. Introduction 
Few  problems  were  more  perplexing  to  the  central  planners  of  East  European 
socialist economies (CPEs) than the maintenance of high growth rates with stability 
(Khanin, 2003; and Whitesell, 1985). A fundamental tenet of socialist development 
theory was that a system built on the state ownership of nonlabor resources and 
the coordinated planning of resource allocation could better provide for a society’s 
needs than other approaches to economic organization and management (Brus and 
Kowalik,  1983;  Kaser  and  Zielinski,  1970;  and  Wilczynski,  1970).  The  ideological 
claims for the superiority of socialism and the  command economy model were 
largely supported by the economic advances that occurred in CPEs after World War 
II,  when  industrial  production  grew  at  rates  substantially  higher  than  those  of 
mature market economies (Alton et al., 1975; Kaser and Zielinski, 1970; Campos et 
al., 2002; Feiwel, 1977; and Nove, 1982).  
These extraordinary growth rates, which were in part accounted for by intensive 
capital formation and a mobilization of labor surpluses from agriculture, diminished 
during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s (Ehrlich, 1991; Gomulka, 1986; Nyiri, 1982; 
and  Pryor,  1985a).  In  particular,  some  of  the  more  advanced  CPEs,  such  as 
Czechoslovakia, GDR, and Hungary began to suffer from the overcentralization of 
decision  making,  excessively  detailed  planning,  rigid  materials  allocation 
procedures, lack of discretion and initiative at the enterprise level, and distortions 
in costs and value produced by administratively determined prices. As productivity 
and  growth  rates  declined,  several  countries  reconsidered  their  policies  and 
methods for implementing the ‘command’ model (Portes, 1969). Few substantive 
changes occurred under reforms, however, except in Hungary (e.g. Bauer , 1990; 
Ben-Ner and Montias, 1991; Bryson, 1990; Estrin, 1991; and Jackson, 1991). As one 
author has stated “Since about 1955 most centrally planned systems have been 
subjected to a sequence of  reforms. All in vain. Some minor corrections in the 
functioning  of  the  systems  were  sometimes  obtained  but  no  fundamental 
improvement  was  ever  brought  about.  For  some  reason  the  centrally  planned 
economies proved to be neither able to perform nor to reform” Drewnowski (1982, 
p. 72). Even during the period of marketization, with changes in the centralization 
versus  decentralization  of  production  and  resource  management  decisions 
beginning in the 1990’s, one author likened reforms to a treadmill and concluded, 
“It seems as if the socialist system rejects measures of reform much as an organism 
may reject transplanted tissue,” (Ickes, 1990, p. 54). 
In addition to declining growth rates, more and more evidence emerged suggesting 
that  instabilities  existed  in  investment  spending,  inventories,  construction,  and 
industrial  and  agricultural  production  (Bleaney,  1991;  and  Summers,  1991).  J. 
Goldmann (1964 and 1965), after studying the annual growth rates (1950-64) of 
industrial production and investment, concluded that several countries in Eastern 
Europe  had  experienced  regular  fluctuations  and,  furthermore,  that  there  was Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
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some evidence that the oscillations were synchronized. Staller (1964), in an inter-
country  comparison  of  instability,  concluded  that  instability  indeed  did  exist  in 
CPEs, and, while the Soviet Union was more stable than the countries of Eastern 
Europe, market economies were more stable than planned economies. The findings 
that widespread fluctuations occurred in economic activity in CPEs and the former 
Soviet Union, many with cyclical characteristics, were later confirmed by (e.g. Bajt, 
1974;  Soos,  1975-76;  Kyn,  Schrettl,  and  Slama,  1979;  Boot,  1984;  Wiles,  1982; 
Hutchings, 1969; Pryor, 1985a), and others. 
Most  of  the  empirical  research  on  instability  in  planned  economies  has  been 
concerned  with  its  identification  and  measurement  in  various  sectors  of  the 
economy, its characterization, and/or comparisons of its relative magnitude with 
market economies. Numerous other writings have offered explanations for what 
has  been  observed,  including  the  origins  of  instability  (Ickes,  1986;  and  Levine, 
1969).  Indeed,  some  authors  have  concluded  that  planners  themselves  were 
contributors to cycles in output and investment activity (Grosfeld, 1986).  
Most  analyses  of  instability  in  the  CPEs  have  focused  on  macro  aggregates  of 
economic activity including output and have searched for the presence or absence 
of  cyclical  movements.  That  is,  “Are  there  observed  movements  in  these  time 
series that possess systemic, periodic and rhythmic properties (Anderson, 1977)?” 
If so, researchers have sought to explore linkages and coincidental characteristics 
between  countries  and  across  sectors,  and  to  conjecture  about  causal  factors 
related  to  economic  organization,  institutional  structure,  culture  and/or  the 
incentives and behaviors of agents. 
In this paper, we focus on an analysis of physical output at the industry level and 
specifically conjecture that there was a relationship between output growth rates 
and  instability.  That  is,  “As  the  tautness  of  plans  increased  and  enterprises 
responded,  did  the  deviations  of  output  remain  relatively  constant  or  did  they 
increase  with  increases  in  growth  rates?”  If  there  was  a  positive  relationship 
between industry output growth rates and production instability, was the rate of 
change constant? To empirically evaluate these hypotheses, we have studied the 
production experiences of approximately twenty-five industries in the seven major 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe:  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  GDR,  Hungary,  Poland, 
Romania and Yugoslavia during the period 1960-80. 
2. Plans, Operations, and Fluctuating Growth Rates 
While there is substantial evidence of fluctuating, indeed cyclical growth rates, little 
or no empirical support has been found for a relationship between instability and 
growth  rates  (Ickes,  1986).  Staller  (1964)  studied  the  association  between 
fluctuations  and  growth  rates  in  total  output,  agriculture,  industry,  and 
construction,  and  concluded  that  there  were  “no  consistent  patterns.”  In 
examining  similar  measures  of  aggregate  activity  in  Eastern  Europe,  to  include Evan E. ANDERSON 
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investment, Bajt (1974) found the cross country rank correlations between average 
rates  of  growth  and  standard  deviations  to  be  negligible,  and  in  some  cases 
negative. Later Pryor (1985b) found a statistically significant relationship between 
the average annual growth rates and fluctuations of GDP and gross fixed capital 
investment, but not in those of industrial or agricultural production. 
Despite these conclusions, there are three important arguments that motivate our 
continued interest in a relationship between output growth rates and instability in 
CPEs.  First,  from  a  historical  perspective,  these  countries,  for  forty  years, 
participated in what was probably the largest, most comprehensive social, political 
and economic experiment ever undertaken. Despite the remarkable reforms and 
transformations  that  have  occurred  in  the  post-1989  period,  the  vastness, 
magnitude,  duration  and  completeness  of  the  nationalization  of  all  non-human 
assets, the institutional structures created and the command-control centralized 
administration  of  resource  utilization  and  output  production  is  overwhelming. 
Second, the foundations of socialist growth theory and the practical implications of 
its implementation suggested that there were strong pressures for over ambitious 
production plans and inadequate signals (flexible prices and timely information) of 
stress in product and resource markets with higher growth rates (Lacko, 1980). 
Inherent in the value system, structures, policies and administrative practices of 
CPEs is the maximization of activity levels and an allocation of resources between 
producer and consumer good industries that were unsustainable. Taut planning 
was the norm and arose for many reasons including asymmetric information at 
various levels of decision making and the belief that there were hidden, unreported 
and  underutilized  resources  that  would  be  revealed  only  by  exaggerated 
expectations (Linz, 1988). However, as Powell (1977, p. 62) noted, “A profound 
difference  between  plan  construction  and  plan  execution  is  that  the  former  is 
unconstrained  by  reality  .  .  .  Actual  deliveries  never  exceed  available  supplies. 
Realized outcomes never lie outside the efficiency frontier.”  
The final motivation for these analyses is that virtually all previous empirical studies 
have been based on highly aggregated data of macroeconomic activity. Brainard 
(1974) has argued that policy cycles intended to create higher production levels, 
greater efficiency or correct for imbalances, for example, are more likely to appear 
in disaggregated data within agriculture or industrial sectors. The aggregation of 
industrial sector data tends  to smooth instabilities at operating levels and may 
conceal the impact of growth rates on instability. Bajt (1971, p. 55), for example, 
noted,  “…While  the  changing  relation  between  two  departments  necessarily 
produces oscillations of production of the two departments, it does not necessarily 
produce  fluctuations  in  the  main  macroeconomic  aggregates.”  Levine  (1969,  p. 
309),  further  noted  that  “…the  absence  of  quarterly  data  limits  our  ability  to 
observe short fluctuations. And the possible uneven overreporting of data from 
below may tend to smooth out fluctuations in growth data.” Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
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To rationalize our conjecture that a relationship may have existed between output 
growth rates and instability at the industry level in CPEs, we first focus on the 
incentives in CPEs to establish growth rates at over-optimum levels, that is, beyond 
those that would have existed under balanced growth ( Hutchings, 1969; and Soos, 
1975-76). The excess of planned output above its equilibrium was accounted for by 
both  accidents  and  oversights,  as  well  as  deliberate,  calculated  decisions  to 
establish  targets  that  were  too  taut.  Successful  planning  and  enterprise 
management  required  an  understanding  of  the  interdependencies  between 
industries,  the  impact  of  changing  technology  on  the  resources  employed  in 
production functions, resource availability, and the character of product demand 
(Hewett, 1980). To the extent that there was ignorance or misunderstanding, one 
can  expect  continuous  experimentation  to  determine  optimal  growth  rates.  In 
explaining the  continuous errors of planners that overstrain the economy, Kyn, 
Schrettl, and Slama (1979, p. 120), argue that “…planners do not know what the 
equilibrium growth path of the economy is.” In a study of investment cycles within 
CPEs, Grosfeld (1986, p. 49) concluded that “adaptive behavior (of planners) plays a 
destabilizing role in ascending and descending phases of the cycle.. .” Kyn et al. 
(1979) suggested that an overstrained economy results in part because of planners’ 
preoccupation  with  growth  rates,  and  essentially  an  indifference  or  lack  of 
awareness of the relationship between an output target and the equilibrium. 
3. Incentives, Information and Corrections 
Beyond information and understanding, planners and enterprise managers were 
not  rewarded  for  efficiency  and/or  profitability.  Hence,  they  had  inadequate 
incentives  to  improve  the  quality  of  employment  and  production  decisions 
(Granick, 1973). The incentive system, in the presence of increasing growth rates, 
encouraged managers to understate the productive potential of their enterprises, 
and  to  accumulate  excessive  inventories  of  resource  inputs  as  a  buffer  against 
shortages  that  might  jeopardize  their  ability  to  fulfill  production  targets.  These 
activities squandered resources because they were employed with widely varying 
marginal  productivities  and/or  because  they  created  bottlenecks  and  shortages 
before  the  full  capacity  levels  of  production  were  reached  (Oliveira,  1960; 
Rostowski  and  Auerbach,  1986;  and  Bauer,  1978).  The  excessive  build  up  of 
inventories and the rapidly declining productivity of resources under higher growth 
rates prematurely terminated expansions and reduced planned and actual growth 
rates.  
Some part of these necessary corrections arose from inadequacies in management 
information  systems,  data  accuracy  and  availability,  and  because  computing 
technologies were unable to optimize the complex interdependencies and linkages 
between the resource inputs and product outputs of industry branches. In CPEs 
there were too few signals of changing product/resource valuation that would have 
indicated the emergence of shortages or surpluses and a probable departure of Evan E. ANDERSON 
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current output from its equilibrium (Brada, 1974). This placed a greater burden on 
information and decision support systems to identify stresses and imbalances in 
the  system  associated  with  higher  growth  rates  so  as  to  facilitate  timely 
corrections. In market economies rising prices indicate resource scarcities, ration 
resources in the short run, and encourage corrective actions. Most prices in CPEs 
were not market determined, nor were they flexible. Hence, early corrections for 
overambitious  plans  were  less  likely,  and  the  need  for  larger  subsequent 
corrections was greater. These conditions tend to lead to more instability in output 
than would otherwise have existed. At the core of instability caused by excessive 
growth rates is the violation of the “law of proportional development,” which is 
fundamental  to  models  of  economic  growth  under  socialism.  Economic  growth 
involved  “balanced  expansion”  between  and  within  aggregate  sectors  that  was 
within  tolerable  and  achievable  proportions,  though  the  proportions  varied 
between countries for many reasons. Goldmann (1964, 1965, and 1969) argued 
that  it  was  the  appearance  of  disproportions  that  necessitated  corrections  and 
caused quasi-cyclical fluctuations in growth rates. He asserted that there was a 
tendency for the raw-material base to lag behind the growth of manufacturing 
industries whenever rates of growth exceeded certain optimum levels because of 
the underfulfillment of production and investment plans in the former industries 
and overfulfillment in the latter (Whitesell, 1985). This in turn led to imbalances in 
foreign trade and nearly always to fluctuations in investments (Massell, 1970; and 
Naya,  1973).  The  various  sectors  of  all  economies  are  interconnected  through 
technology,  input-output  relationships,  shared  use  of  the  infrastructure,  and 
competing demands for materials, energy, labor, and capital (Powell, 1977). Hence, 
the growth rate of any particular industry must be balanced with that of other 
industries to which it relates. Growth rates in the industries of CPEs that exceeded 
their equilibria eventually created shortages, bottlenecks, delays, and resulted in 
only partially fulfilled plans  (Boot, 1984).  Since  prices give no warning of these 
conditions, they usually occurred as realized experiences, at which point there was 
a  correction.  Growth  rates  were  reduced,  and  instability  resulted.  As  Grosfeld 
(1986, p. 46) stated, “. . .the expansion stops because it hits a ceiling.”  
In practice, there were also important political explanations for the correction of 
excessive growth rates in CPEs. Every economy is ultimately judged by the extent to 
which it is capable of satisfying the consumption expectations of its population. 
Indeed, failures of the system to improve the population’s standard of living may 
jeopardize its political stability (Turnock, 1978;  and Nove, 1969). Over-optimum 
growth  rates  for  heavy  industry,  high  labor  employment,  and  improved 
expectations for consumption, if unmet, will eventually lead to political pressures 
for  changes  in  the  relative  growth  rates  and  priorities  given  to  producer  and 
consumer good industries (Bunce, 1980). The back and forth shifts in the relative 
emphasis of industrialization and consumption, that is, a “growth conflict” (Bajt, 
1966), created instability. Consumption possibilities as revealed in the availability, 
variety, quality and cost of goods eventually formed a constraint to the share of Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
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output that could be devoted to capital and military spending without social and 
political implications (Bleaney, 1991). 
4. Data and Measurements 
The data for this study are indices of annual production (output) for three digit ISIC 
industries and  were published by the United Nations in various editions of the 
Yearbook  of  Industrial  Statistics:  Vol.  I.  Approximately  twenty-five  different 
industries are included, such as, food products, textiles, wearing apparel, leather 
products, wood products, industrial chemicals, petroleum refining, plastic products, 
non-metal  products,  iron  and  steel,  and  electrical  machinery.  These  industries 
populate most of the CPEs industrial branches and represent a variety of means 
and  methods,  processes,  capital-labor  combinations  and  customer  types 
(consumer,  industrial,  military,  foreign  exports).  See  Table  1  for  a  complete 
summary of the data set for each country and source citations.  
Our statistical analyses involve two stages. First, we estimate the instability (I) and 
growth  rate  (G)  of  each  industry,  in  each  country,  over  its  sample  period.  The 
number of annual observations varies, as can be seen in Table 1, from industry to 
industry and country to country. In most cases, the time period for I and G is 1960-
80. Second, we then use these estimates as data, and estimate the parameters of 
linear and nonlinear models for each country, where the I and G of each industry 
are  endogenous  and  exogenous  variables.  The  number  of  observations  that  is, 
industries contained in each country’s sample was: Bulgaria (22), Czechoslovakia 
(25),  GDR  (18),  Hungary  (23),  Poland  (24),  Romania  (19),  and  Yugoslavia  (25), 
respectively.  
Numerous  alternative  measures  of  “I”  have  been  proposed,  each  possessing 
various strengths and weaknesses (e.g. Deans and Bernstein, 1978; Coppock, 1977; 
Brodsky,  1980;  Ickes,  1990;  and  Paldam,  1983).  Most  of  these  measures  are 
computed from some version of the mean squared error of fluctuation around an 
estimated function of the long run, equilibrium path of activity, or from variations 
in the actual activity levels as measured by the standard deviation or coefficient of 
variation (Cuddy and Valle, 1978; and Naya, 1973).  
In this study, the author has chosen to use the coefficient of variation because the 
conditions and experiences of the different industries in each country can not be 
uniformly represented by a predefined model, or family of models. The relatively 
small number of annual observations within each industry as well as numerous 
other  specification  and  estimation  problems,  preclude  the  use  of  time  series 
methods. Indeed, in numerous cases a model can not be found with statistically 
significant parameters, other than the intercept, in which case its mean squared 
error is not a valid measure of instability (Yu, 1987). Additionally, comparability 
between industries is difficult to achieve with the standard deviation of activity 
levels because of scale or index differences.  Evan E. ANDERSON 
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Table 1: Industrial Production Data: Sample Periods by Industry and Country 
COUNTRY 
Primary Industry
a.  Bulgaria 
Czecho-
slovakia  G D R  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Yugoslavia 
Food Products
1  1967-80  1960-80  1963-76  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Textiles  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Wearing Apparel  1960-80  1960-80  1963-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Leather and Products  1960-80  1960-80  1963-80
2  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80
2  1960-80 
Footwear  1960-80  1960-80  -------
2  1960-80  1960-80  --------
2  1960-80 
Wood Products  1960-80  1960-80  1963-80
3  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80
3  1960-80 
Furniture, Fixture  1960-80  1960-80  ---------
3  1960-80  1960-80  ----------
3  1960-80 
Paper and Products  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Printing, Publishing  1960-80  1960-80  n.a.  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Industrial Chemicals  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-72  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Other Chemical Prod.  1960-80  1960-80  n.a.  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Petroleum, Refineries  n.a.  1960-80  1960-80
4  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Petroleum, Coal Prod.  n.a.  1960-80  ---------
4  n.a.  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Rubber Products  1960-80  1960-80  1963-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-72  1960-80 
Pottery, China, etc.  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80
5  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80
5  1960-80 
Glass and Products  1960-80  1960-80  ---------
5  1960-80  1960-80  ---------
5  1960-80 
Non-metal Products  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Iron and Steel  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80
6  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Metal Products  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Machinery, n.e.c  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Electrical Machinery  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80 
Transport Equipment  1960-80  1960-80  1960-72  1960-80  1960-80  n.a.  1960-80 
Professional Goods  n.a.  1960-80  1960-72  1960-80  1960-80  n.a.  1960-80 
Other Industries  1960-80  1960-80  n.a.  1960-80  1960-80  n.a.  1960-80 
Electricity, Gas, Steam  1960-80  1960-80  1960-80  n.a.  1960-76  1960-80  1960-80 
Source: Yearbook of Industrial Statistics: VOL. I, Department of International Economic Social Statistics, United 
Nations, Editions 1969, 1973, 1977, and 1980: 
a. "Primary Industry" is based on the ISIC Classification;  
1. For some countries, food products includes beverages and/or tobacco 
2. Leather and Products and Footwear are aggregated into a single index; 
3. Wood Products, and Furniture and Fixtures are aggregated into a single index; 
4. Petroleum Refineries, and Petroleum and Coal Products are aggregated into a single index; 
5. Pottery, China, etc. and Glass and Products are aggregated into a single index; and; 
6. Iron and Steel, and Non-ferrous Metals are aggregated into a single index. 
It has also been argued, where growth rates are used as data, that the coefficient 
of variation provides a perspective for relative change by discounting the standard 
deviation by a benchmark of growth, that is, the mean (Portes, 1974; and Seton, 
1969).  
As with measures of instability, numerous approaches have been proposed for the 
measurement  of  activity  growth  rates  (e.g.  Campos  et  al.,  2002;  Klotz,  1973; 
Levenboch and Reuter, 1976; Adamowitz and Manning, 1985; and Darby, 1984). 
For reasons noted above, estimates of growth rates from “fitted” models could not 
be consistently employed across all industries. Therefore, nonparametric methods 
were  employed.  Over  the  sample  period  of  each  industry,  the  following  three Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
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growth rates were estimated: the average continuous compounded growth rate, 
the geometric growth rate, and the arithmetic average growth rate. 
The similarity or redundancy of these three measures in the context of industrial 
production was examined by analyzing the Pearson product-moment correlations 
between them. The smallest bivariate correlation found between any two growth 
rate  measures  in  any  country  was  highly  significant  at  .95.  Therefore,  we  have 
concluded that the three measures yield nearly identical results in this application, 
and that any one of them is a sufficient measure of  growth rates. Hence, G is 
measured by the average continuous compounded growth rate.  
5. Hypotheses and Models 
The conjectured relationship between I and G concerns both the existence of such 
a relationship, as well as the nature of that relationship. A theoretical argument for 
the conjectured relationship can be found in Banerjee and Spagat (1992), where 
the output level of an industry is specified as a linear function of the variance of 
output and parameters based on the actions of branch ministries. Using this model, 
they state, “. . raising an output target in some range might increase the expected 
output of a firm, but such an action might also raise the variance of output as the 
probability  of  nonfulfillment  of  the  plan  rises”  (p.  304).  In  this  paper,  two 
hypotheses are tested. The first states that no relationship exists between I and G, 
with an alternative hypothesis that argues for a positive relationship. That is, as 
output growth rates increase, plans become tauter and tauter, there is less and less 
slack  in  resource  availability  resulting  in  shortages  and  declining  marginal 
productivities,  and  the  supply  chain  coordinations  between  interdependent 
industries  becomes  more  difficult.  As  has  been  noted  by  Banerjee  and  Spagat 
(1992), the cost of constraining the variance of output increases with greater and 
greater  growth  expectations.  Eventually,  a  downward  correction  occurs  that  is 
larger and more frequent as growth rates are pushed well beyond their “natural 
rates.” If the null hypothesis is rejected and a positive relationship is discovered 
between I and G, the  second level of analysis investigates  whether the rate of 
change in that relationship is constant or increasing.  
To test these two hypotheses, we have estimated the parameters of the following 
two models: 
Linear Model     Ii=α+βGi+εi      (1) 
and 
Exponential Model  Ii=e 
A+BGi 
+µ i      (2)  
where Ii, Gi refer to the output instability and growth rate of the i
th industry; εi and 
µi are random disturbance terms (Naya, 1973; and Ickes, 1990). Using the data (Ii, 
Gi)  for  each  country,  the  parameters  of  Equations  (1)  and  (2)  were  estimated. 
Hereafter, we will drop the subscripts to Equations (1) and (2). It should be noted Evan E. ANDERSON 
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that Equation (2) is intrinsically linear since Z=A+BG+µ, where Z=ln I. Hence, A and B 
were estimated by ordinary least squares.  
The first hypothesis will be tested by examining the sign and statistical significance 
of parameter estimates     and   . The second hypothesis involves comparing the 
two  models  to  determine  which  equation  provides  the  best  estimate  of  the 
relationship between I and G. Of course, the second hypothesis is irrelevant if    and 
    are negative or not significantly different from zero. If the first null hypothesis is 
rejected, a choice between the two models, that is, a test of the second hypothesis, 
will  be  based  on  Akaike’s  (1973)  information  criterion  for  model  selection.  To 
define that criterion for these two models, let their log likelihood functions be log L 
(Z |A, B) and log H (I |α, β), and their estimators be    = (   ,   ,   2) and    =(   ,   ,    2), 
respectively. Then the information criterion is 
Q=          (log L (   |   ,   )) -	         (log H (   |   ,   )    (3) 
Equation (3) would be invoked when at least one of the models had a statistically 
significant  F  statistic.  The  decision  rule  involving  Equation  (3)  would  select  the 
exponential model when Q>0, and the linear model when Q<0. If Q=0, we would be 
unable to distinguish between the two models and, therefore, have no preference 
for one over the other. Under the information criterion a positive Q implies that a 
nonlinear relationship exists between I and G, and that incremental increases, of a 
constant amount, in growth rates results in larger and larger output instability. 
6. Empirical Results 
As can be seen from Table 2, the slope coefficients (   and   ) of both models are 
positive  and  highly  significant  across  all  countries.  Additionally,  the  fit  of  each 
model, as measured by the R2, is exceptionally good. Given these results, we have 
strong empirical evidence for the conjecture that there was a direct relationship 
between the growth rates of industrial production and output instability in CPEs. 
The weakest case for the conjecture seems to have been with the GDR, where 
growth rates are lower and, hence, the variance is smaller. 
Table 2: Parameter Estimates and Statistics 
Model 
Estimate 
/ Statistic  Bulgaria 
Czecho-
slovakia  GDR  Hungary  Poland  Romania  Yugoslavia 
Linear       439.31*  492.33*  429.54*  490.14*  502.23*  376.23*  494.40* 
(t)
a  13.26  16.71  4.50  14.86  18.06  6.39  12.00 
R
2   0.90  0.92  0.56  0.91  0.94  0.71  0.86 
Exponential      
  8.56*  13.72*  12.45*  16.30*  11.42*  6.27*  10.89* 
(t)
a  10.19  11.91  4.27  12.54  11.53  5.93  10.19 
R
2   0.84  0.86  0.53  0.88  0.86  0.67  0.82 
Model Comparison:  Q
b  84.59  90.63  69.63  77.51  95.46  80.32  91.31 
a. t statistic.     b. Q>0 implies that the exponential model is superior to the linear model under the 
information criterion defined by Equation (3.0) * statistically significant for α = .05. Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
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Rejecting the null hypothesis (β=0, B=0), we have examined the second assertion 
that   I/ G=  constant.  Using  Akaike’s  (1973)  information  criterion  for  model 
selection,  the  computed  results  for  Equation  (3)  are  shown  in  Table  2;  they 
consistently indicate that the exponential model is superior to the linear model. 
Thus, in addition to the positive relationship between I and G in CPEs, it appears 
that instability increases at an increasing rate with the growth rates of industrial 
production. See Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: The Empirical Relationship between Industrial Growth Rates and 
Instability: Hungary 
 
Figure 2: The Empirical Relationship between Industrial Growth Rates and 
Instability: Bulgaria 
 Evan E. ANDERSON 
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7.  A  Decomposition  of  Production  Instability:  Conjectures  and 
Explanations 
Either the linear or exponential model provides an empirical model that supports a 
decomposition of production instabilities at the industry level and potential insights 
into their sources (Dahlstedt, 1979; and Hewett, 1980). In particular, it may be 
argued  that  the  intercept  and  the  variable  term  of  each  equation  represent 
different sources of instability. Since the exponential model was consistently found 
to best represent the relationship between I and G, subsequent analyses will ignore 
the linear model. 
To decompose instability, first consider the instability that would occur without the 
stresses  of  growth.  A  zero  growth  environment  would  be  characterized  by  a 
comparative abundance of resources, relaxed plans, few binding constraints, and 
adequate inventories throughout supply chains. A no growth economy would be 
essentially  replicating  production  plans  and  objectives  over  time  within  stable 
budgets and institutions. Experience curves would be very mature and investment 
expenditures  would  be  devoted  to  replacement  of  capital  consumed.  It  is 
conjectured  that  the  intercept  may  be  interpreted  as  the  instability  that  arises 
(G=0, i.e.    = e   ) from the systemic structure, including the organizational design 
and  institutions  of  CPEs.  It  includes  the  bureaucracy,  the  extent  of  resource 
nationalization,  the  economic,  political  and  social  priorities,  the  country’s 
infrastructure, technology embedded in capital, and natural resource endowment ( 
e.g. Brus, 1980; Portes, 1971; Mesa-Lago, 1973; Blazyca, 1980; Khanin, 2003; and 
Grossman,  1983).  Bornstein  (1985)  defines  part  of  structure  as  the  economic 
mechanism,  which  includes:  the  procedures  for  planning  and  investment,  the 
allocation  of  goods  through  ‘material-supply’  channels  and  inter-enterprise 
contracts,  the  performance  indicators  by  which  the  activities  of  enterprises, 
associations,  and  ministries  are  evaluated,  and  the  incentive  structure  for 
managers and workers. 
A  condition  of  zero  growth  involves  sufficient  slack  such  that  the  destabilizing 
influences of the administrative policies and practices involved in the operational 
implementation of plans are benign. There is little or no stress on economic agents 
that  implement  directives,  that  is  manage  activities  and  operations.  In  a  zero 
growth environment there are fewer imbalances, less need for corrections and less 
variation in industry output. See Figure 3.  
As Pryor (1985b, p. 66) has noted, “The performance of an economic system is not 
only a result of its structural elements and environment, but also of the measures 
taken by certain important policy makers in the system.” Decisions are made and 
actions are taken that produce goods and services, employ resources, establish 
prices,  and  generate  income.  However,  the  functionality  of  all  systems,  as 
measured  by  instability,  is  not  constant.  Indeed,  it  may  be  argued  that  the 
increasing rate of instability associated with higher growth rates in CPEs derived Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
 
 
EJBE 2011, 4 (8)                                                                                           Page | 63 
from  the  inability  of  institutions  to  perform  with  the  same  effectiveness  under 
conditions of growing scarcity, complexity and time-dependent activities. Higher 
growth rates removed slack and strained the capacities of institutions to mobilize 
and  direct  resources,  design  production  and  distribution  systems,  advance 
technology, and satisfy employment, income, and consumption expectations of the 
population. These instabilities derived from the availability, quality and timeliness 
of information, and administrative practices and policies that operationalized plans. 
That is, operational implementation factors. They are estimated in Figure 3 by     
=     . 
Figure 3: A Decomposition of Instability: Sources 
The first row of Table 3 presents the estimated instability of each country under 
zero growth, that is, the intercept. It is interesting to note that the amount of 
systemic structural instability varies substantially between countries, and that it 
was largest in some of the CPEs with the highest degree of state ownership and 
most rigidly controlled economies, for example, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Table 3: Estimated Instability: Levels and Percentage Changes by Country 
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I   21.91  15.59  15.89  11.67  18.40  29.42  18.91 
G= 0.0%  %ΔI
a   ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------ 
 
I   27.14  21.97  21.69  17.54  24.49  34.41  24.82 
G=2.5%  %ΔI
a   23.87  40.92  36.51  50.31  33.05  16.96  31.28 
 
I   33.62  30.96  29.61  26.36  32.58  40.25  32.59 
G=5.0%  %ΔI
a   53.44  98.57  86.35  125.92  77.03  36.79  72.35 
 
I   41.65  43.63  40.42  39.62  43.35  47.07  42.78 
G=7.5%  %ΔI
a   90.08  179.82  154.39  239.58  135.55  59.99  126.26 
 
I   51.59  61.49  55.17  59.55  57.67  55.06  56.16 
G=10.0%  %ΔI
a   135.45  294.31  247.28  410.41  213.41  87.12  197.03 
a %ΔI = the percentage change in instability is computed from a base of zero growth. Evan E. ANDERSON 
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In  Romania  and  Bulgaria  there  were  few  substantive  changes  in  the  degree  of 
resource  nationalization,  the  structural  organization  of  institutions  involved  in 
production  and  investment,  the  autonomy  of  economic  agents,  and  the 
components of incentive systems.(Ben-Ner and Montias, 1991; and Jackson, 1991).  
By comparison the instability derived from systemic structural factors was much 
less in Hungary, the most reformed economy. As Noti (1987) stated, “the guiding 
principle  of  reform  in  Hungary  has  been  the  decentralization  of  power.”  The 
concentration  of  resource  ownership  and  power  was  diminished  in  Hungary, 
resulting in more initiative at local levels, more competition, more flexibility and 
moderation in the choice of activity levels and directions, and increasing resource 
productivity (Hare, 1991).  
The instability created by systemic structural factors was lower than expected in 
the GDR, but higher than expected in Yugoslavia. The mechanism of East Germany, 
despite hopes for the New Economic System (1963), was not reformed much more 
than those of Romania and Bulgaria. However, in an effort to balance supply and 
demand  they  implemented  a  contract  system  and  institutionalized  slack  plans 
(Keren, 1973). This created lower growth rates and reduced the debilitating effects 
of the system that probably would have been observed under more taut plans. 
Additionally, the data of East Germany was more highly aggregated than for other 
countries  and  this  tends  to  smooth  actual  variations  and  diminish  measured 
instability.  
One might have expected to observe a lower level of systemic structural instability 
in Yugoslavia than was estimated (Horvat, 1971). Yugoslavia, beginning in 1952, 
progressively  took  steps  to  allow  individuals  and  enterprises  greater  economic 
freedoms and opportunities, greatly reduced the role, scope, and size of planning 
bureaucracies,  and  implemented  incentive  systems  and  price  signals  that 
encouraged  efficiency  (Estrin,  1991).  However,  two  important  aspects  of  the 
Yugoslav  economic  system  may have diminished the  stabilizing effects of these 
reforms. First, though many aspects of a market economy existed in Yugoslavia, 
their markets were very imperfect and highly regulated (Sacks, 1973). Second, the 
institution of workers’ management substantially changes the distribution of power 
and information in economic decisions (Estrin, 1982). This creates a more complex 
decision environment, affects risk taking behaviors, and the timeliness of economic 
actions. It seems plausible that these two conditions of the Yugoslav system may 
have reduced its ability to manage scarcity and complexity and to make timely 
corrective adjustments under high growth rates.  
Table 3 also presents estimates of expected instability under various growth rate 
scenarios, and their associated percentage change relative to G=0. For growth rates 
that were probably sustainable over the long run, that is, 2.5%≤G≤5.0%, there is 
substantial difference in estimated instabilities across the CPEs. In this range of 
growth rates, the rank order of CPEs from the least to the most instable (estimated) 
was: Hungary, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania. The Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
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incremental  instability  from  a  “no  growth”  base  is  associated  with  the 
abilities/inabilities  of  enterprise  units  to  implement  tauter  plans.  This  required 
resource  coordination,  available  resources  and  policies  that  encouraged 
productivity  improvements,  information  for  coordination  and  optimization, 
flexibility  and  early  signals  of  imbalances.  All  countries,  regardless  of  their 
structural organization of economic institutions and activities experience output 
volatility (Horvat, 1984).  The question is, “Were there processes, administrative 
systems, managerial empowerments, information and flexible decision making that 
facilitated timely corrections?”  
It is interesting to note that while Hungary and Czechoslovakia had low systemic 
structural instability, they had the largest incremental variation in industry growth 
rates from G=0 to G=5%. Both had undergone and achieved much greater success 
with reforms, had less labor slack in peasant agriculture and were more advanced 
industrial nations with more complex interdependencies and supply chain linkages 
to administer.  
Table 4 presents the percentage of each country’s instability derived from systemic 
structural versus operational implementation sources, respectively, for alternative 
growth rates. The market oriented, more decentralized CPEs tended to derive more 
(less) of their instability from the operational implementation of plans (systemic 
structure  and  organization)  then  did  the  more  rigidly  planned,  command 
economies. It is clear that the opportunities to reduce instability through systemic 
structural reforms was greater in Romania and Bulgaria. Indeed, it appears that 
each could have had much more stable output levels, with reasonably high growth 
rates, if those reforms had been undertaken. However, those reforms may have 
increased the instabilities associated with the operational implementation of plans 
based on the experience of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is unclear as to whether 
there  were  tradeoffs  between  the  two,  where  decreases  in  one  increased  the 
other.  
Table 4: A Decomposition of Instability 
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G= 0.0%  100.0  0.00  100.0  0.00  100.0  0.00  100.0  0.00  100.0  0.00  100.0  0.00  100.0  0.00 
G=2.5%  80.73  19.27  70.96  29.04  73.25  26.75  66.53  33.47  75.16  24.84  85.50  14.50  76.17  23.83 
G=5.0%  65.17  34.83  50.36  49.64  53.66  46.34  44.26  55.74  56.49  43.51  73.10  26.90  58.02  41.98 
G=7.5%  52.61  47.39  35.74  64.26  39.31  60.69  29.45  70.55  42.45  57.55  62.51  37.49  44.20  55.80 
G=10.0%  42.47  57.53  25.36  74.64  28.80  71.20  19.59  80.41  31.91  68.09  53.44  46.56  33.67  66.33 
a System (%) + Policies (%) = 100.0. Evan E. ANDERSON 
 
 
Page | 66                                                                               EJBE 2011, 4 (8) 
8. Conclusions 
Every society aspires to a higher standard of living and wishes to enjoy its benefits 
sooner rather than later. In market economies, the pace of these developments 
depends very substantially on the inherent motivations, incentives, and abilities of 
individual economic agents and, therefore, more nearly follows a natural rate. In 
the  former  CPEs,  state  politicians  and  planners  defined  the  system  and  its 
institutions,  and  established  policies,  priorities  and  standards.  They  directly 
intervened  in  the  direction  and  rate  of  economic  activity.  For  many  different 
reasons, their pursuit of economic growth was frequently overzealous and at rates 
that  could  not  be  sustained  over  the  long  run.  Eventually,  growth  rates  were 
corrected downward and instability resulted.  
In  this  study,  we  have  found  compelling  empirical  evidence  that  instability  in 
industrial production in the former CPEs increased at an increasing rate with output 
growth rates during the crucial years of socialism and central planning. Instability 
increased  by  over  fifty  percent  in  all  countries,  except  Romania,  as  the  output 
growth  rate  increased  from  zero  to  five  percent,  that  is,  a  sustainable  or  near 
sustainable level. This implies that an intensification of production efforts (tauter 
plans) was associated with very substantial costs resulting from excessive slack or 
shortage of resource inputs and product outputs, an underutilization of labor and 
capital, excessive inventories, and unfulfilled consumer aspirations. The economic 
system,  under  central  planning,  was  not  indifferent  to  the  tautness  of  activity 
levels, and it appears that it was not capable of self correcting adjustments that 
would relieve and/or accommodate the stress of higher growth rates. That is, the 
processes, policies and administrative systems and practices used to operationalize 
plans  were  incapable  of  creating  higher,  but  sustainable  growth  rates  without 
substantial instability and higher costs. These costs had a hidden but substantial 
impact  on  the  actual  value  of  the  income  and  product  stream  if  it  had  been 
discounted by the cost of instability, which was increasing at a faster rate than 
output.  
Equally interesting were the results of a decomposition of instability based on its 
sources:  systemic  structure  versus  operational  implementation.  There  were 
substantial differences between countries in the estimated amounts of instability 
associated with each. It appears that the more market oriented economies, such as 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, had considerably less instability derived from their 
fundamental  structures,  organization  and  institutions,  but  as  much  or  more 
resulting  from  their  operational  implementation  of  plans  and  directives.  By 
comparison, for an output growth rate of five percent, it is estimated that sixty-five 
percent  or  more  of  total  instability  in  industrial  production  was  derived  from 
systemic structural factors in countries such as Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, 
it  appears  from  these  findings  that  opportunities  indeed  did  exist  for  some 
countries to substantially reduce their instability through system reforms and that 
some countries, for example, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, benefited from their Industrial Growth Rates and Instability: An Historical Analysis of the Former Centrally… 
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reforms. As they made substantial changes in the economic structure, organization, 
incentives,  ownership  and  flexibilities  given  economic  agents,  they  lowered  the 
costs of instability and, thereby, raised the value of income and product created by 
industry.  
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